




































©1997KluwerAcademicPublishers.PrintedintheNetherlands.nomic performances of the European Union and the United States, there are
strong indications that labour market institutions do matter very much ~e.g., Bean
~1994!, OECD ~1994!!. This performance is characterized by historically unprec-
edented low European levels of unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s, the pe-
riod of catching up with the USA. In the late 1960s, however, European unem-
ployment started to rise steadily, whereas the US unemployment rate periodically
returned to its ‘natural rate.’
The answer to the intriguing question of why European countries do no longer
increase their productivity level relative to the USA is still a very open one. This
paper develops a simple two-region endogenous growth model with tradeable
~high-tech! and non-tradeable ~traditional! goods, to shed some light on this ques-
tion. Trade takes place in varieties of a differentiated product, so that the model
can be classiﬁed under the heading of the ‘new trade theory’ ~e.g., Krugman
~1990!!. Within this context, the question whether sectoral structures can differ
among countries in such a way that they hamper or speed up economic growth is
dealt with. Thereby we will mainly focus on the role of unemployment compen-
sations in determining the sectoral allocation of labour. In distinguishing Europe
from the USA, it is evident that these systems differ a lot between the two re-
gions, both in duration and in height. It will be argued that the generosity of
unemployment compensations in Europe led to a society with relatively few
people from the total work force employed in the high-tech tradeables sector of
the economy. As, in our model, technological progress stems from this sector,
there is a direct link between the generosity of the unemployment compensation
system and economic growth. Thereby, we add to the scarce amount of literature
on the relation between economic growth and unemployment ~e.g., Bean and Pis-
sarides ~1993!, Aghion and Howitt ~1994!, and Bean and Crafts ~1995!!.2 All
these studies focus on distortions in the demand for labour. In contrast, we focus
on distortions in the supply of labour resulting from generous unemployment
compensations and non-competitive wage differentials. Furthermore, we model
unemployment as resulting from efficiency wage considerations playing a role in
one sector only, which allows us, among other things, to address the problem of
2 Most of the studies currently available on the relation between growth and unemployment address
the issue from a search perspective. Equilibrium unemployment results from frictions in the process
of matching the unemployed with vacancies posted by ﬁrms. The most comprehensive study in this
ﬁeld is Aghion and Howitt ~1994!. In their model, economic growth results in creative destruction
and accompanying lay-off of workers. Growth thus increases the rate of job separation and ~partially!
increases the unemployment rate. However, growth also affects the rate of job ﬁnding by ~i! increas-
ing the present value of a job match for the ﬁrm ~the capitalization effect! and ~ii! decreasing the
average lifetime of a ﬁrm. The ﬁrst effect tends to decrease the equilibrium unemployment rate while
the second effect tends to increase it. Bean and Crafts ~1995! consider the potential relation between
growth and unemployment from a different angle. In their model, a crucial role is played by the so
called ‘hold-up’ problem. The essence of this problem is that ﬁrms have an incentive to underinvest
in growth promoting activities in the presence of trade unions and in the absence of binding con-
tracts.
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ﬁciency wage considerations can be seen as an institutional factor that is the most
important in determining the distribution of labour across the sectors of the
economy. Another contribution to the literature is that we address the problem in
the context of a two-country model, which allows us to look at the potential ef-
fects of labour market institutions on the relative performance of countries, both
in terms of unemployment and growth.
The introduction of a two-region model raises the question about the external
relatedness of sectors, that is, how the productivity of the tradeables sector in one
region does affect the productivity of that sector in another region. In general,
technological progress can be conceived either as a ‘free good,’ as a by-product
of other economic activities, or as the result of intentional R&D activities in pri-
vate ﬁrms. It is now increasingly accepted that the third source ~innovation, as
the outcome of intentional activities in private ﬁrms! is one of the most impor-
tant sources of technological progress in OECD economies ~cf. Dosi ~1988!,
Fagerberg ~1994!!. Recently, Van de Klundert and Smulders ~1996! have incor-
porated the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge and the idea that ﬁrms can
learn from each other in a two-sector two-region model, distinguishing traditional
and high-tech goods, which can both be traded between regions. We follow these
authors by assuming that the backward region can learn from the advanced coun-
try, but not the other way around. In other words, the backward region can copy
production processes at a relatively low cost and has an opportunity to catch up
~cf. Krugman ~1990!, Barro and Sala-i-Martin ~1995!!. However, in contrast with
the usual assumptions in the literature on trade and endogenous economic growth,
we allow labour market institutions and unemployment to play a prominent role
in our model. In addition, we assume that the production of traditional goods
only takes place in the non-tradeables sector. The inclusion of a non-tradeable
sector has various reasons. First of all, it is important from an empirical point of
view, as sheltered sectors constitute a large part of the economy. Secondly, we
want to focus – among other things – on the dual character of the labour market.
In order to be able to do so, we need two substantial sectors that make up the
economy. Tradeability of traditional goods therefore had to be excluded as this
makes full specialization possible ~cf. Van de Klundert and Smulders ~1996!!. Fi-
nally, the distinction between a tradeables and a non-tradeables sector is impor-
tant in relation to the knowledge spillovers in our model. It seems reasonable to
assume that these spillovers are most prominent in the tradeables sector ~see Coe
and Helpman ~1995! for an empirical study on this issue, conﬁrming the signiﬁ-
cance of R&D spillovers, which are stronger the more open an economy is to
foreign trade!. We will take the most extreme position by assuming that there are
no spillovers whatsoever in the non-tradeables sector.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Equilibrium unemploy-
ment and the allocation of labour over sectors is discussed in section 3. The di-
vision of labour over sectors turns out not to depend on the dynamics of the
181 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UPmodel. These dynamics will be presented in section 4. The model predicts that
~nearly! symmetrical countries, only differing in their initial labour productivity
levels in the high-tech sector, will fully converge. However, if sectoral structures
differ between countries, this will no longer hold. In this case, there are possi-
bilities for leapfrogging or relative convergence, i.e., steadily lagging behind the
leader region. The results will be used to shed some more light on the develop-
ment of the countries of the European Union vis-a `-vis the USA in the post World
War II period. Thereby, we will focus on differences in the system of unemploy-
ment compensations between the two regions. Section 5 contains an evaluation in
which we will confront the theoretical analysis in this paper with empirical evi-
dence. We conclude in section 6.
2 A DUAL ECONOMY
The world consists of two almost identical regions with two differences only.
Firstly, the backward region ~the European Union, labelled region 2! initially has
a substantially lower labour productivity in the high-tech sector compared with
the leader region ~the USA, labelled region 1!. The initial positions are inherited
from the past. Secondly, the welfare systems ~as represented in the model by an
exogenous unemployment compensation! differ between both regions. Each re-
gion produces two types of goods, viz. non-tradeable traditional goods and trade-
able high-tech goods. The factors of production are labour, ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowl-
edge, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc efficiency of workers. In each region there are n ﬁrms
~i51 ,... ,n ! in the high-tech sector,3 which compete monopolistically on the
world market for 2n varieties of the high-tech products ~n is assumed to be suf-
ﬁciently large!. Each ﬁrm is assumed to produce a unique brand.
In the non-tradeables sector there is unitary labour productivity
y5LN, ~1!
where LN stands for the number of workers employed in the non-tradeables sec-
tor, and y is the production of non-tradeables. Assuming perfect competition in
the non-tradeables sector, the price of a non-tradeable good equals labour costs
pN5wN, ~2!
3 The number of ﬁrms is chosen to be exogenous. We deliberately abstain from the complex issue
of entry and exit behaviour and all related strategic considerations. They are interesting in their own
right ~see for example Van Schaik and De Groot ~1995!!, but not essential for the issues we want to
focus on in this paper. Another reason for this choice is that an exogenously given number of ﬁrms
with persistent excess proﬁt opportunities matches real world phenomena quite well ~see Mueller
~1986!!.
182 H.L.F. DE GROOT AND A.B.T.M. VAN SCHAIKwhere pN denotes the price of non-tradeables, and wN is the wage rate in this
sector.
High-tech ﬁrms employ ~direct or productive! labour ~Lxi! for production of
goods that has labour productivity hi, and efficiency ei, leading to xi units of out-
put
xi5hi ei Lxi. ~3!
The efficiency of a high-tech production worker is a variable that can be affected
by the wage-setting behaviour of the ﬁrm. The variable hi on the other hand de-
pends on international forces and the number of workers employed in the Re-
search and Development lab of the ﬁrm ~hi will be further explained in sec-
tion 4!. To simplify the analysis, we assume that each ﬁrm employs a ﬁxed
proportion b~.0! of the number of production workers in R&D activities
Lri5bLxi, ~4!
where Lri is labour employed in R&D activities.4
Total nominal income ~I! consists of labour income and proﬁts ~npi!
I5wNLN1nwTi~Lxi1Lri!1npi, where
pi5pTixi2wTi~Lxi1Lri!.
Here pTi is the price of the tradeable good i, and wTi the wage rate of ﬁrm i.
Substituting pi and Equations ~1! and ~2! result in5
I5pNy1npTixi. ~5!
Based on a two-step optimization procedure where consumer preferences are
speciﬁed according to a Cobb-Douglas consumption index, we derive that con-
4 We thus implicitly assume that ﬁrms employ research labour according to some rule of thumb.
The main justiﬁcation for this is that the future fruits of doing R&D are inherently uncertain, not
justifying the use of a perfect foresight model to derive R&D inputs. It can thus be argued that the
use of rules of thumb for determining R&D input ~for example, R&D expenditures being a ﬁxed
proportion of proﬁts! is closer to the truth than the use of perfect foresight. There is, however, large
debate on the best way of modelling R&D expenditures. Alternatively, in Van Schaik and De Groot
~1995!, for a closed economy, we explicitly determine the number of research workers on the basis of
fully optimizing behaviour of a ﬁrm, which explicitly takes into account the fruits of employing R&D
labour in terms of increased future productivity. In this case, the ﬁrm allocates its labour among pro-
duction and research in such a way that the marginal productivity of labour in the two activities is
equalized. In equilibrium, each ﬁrm employs a ﬁxed proportion ~b! of its production labour to R&D
activities.
5 As there are no international capital ﬂows in the model, trade must be balanced at every moment
in time. This requires that the value of spending equals national income.
183 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UPsumers spend a fraction s of total nominal income on high-tech ~tradeable! goods
and a fraction ~12s! on traditional ~non-tradeable! goods. Preferences between
traditional and high-tech goods are assumed to be identical across regions. For
the non-tradeables it can then be derived that
~12s!I5ypN. ~6!
Preferences over varieties are also uniform across regions and are given by a
CES-function ~cf. Dixit and Stiglitz ~1977!, with an elasticity of substitution equal
to e~.1!!. Consequently, world demand for any variety produced in a region 1
relative to world demand for any variety produced in region 2 ~assuming sym-
metry within a region!









This relation holds for both regions and will only occur once in the fully speci-
ﬁed model.
High-tech ﬁrms maximize their operating proﬁts,
7 using labour input and the
wage rate as their instruments. This behaviour results in a ﬁxed mark-up over
labour costs, and a wage rate that is chosen such that it minimizes labour costs
resulting from production ~yielding the so called Solow-condition!. The mark-up







This relation shows that real wages in the tradeables sector increase with labour
productivity h. Unit real labour costs ~wT/ehpT! equal ~e21!/e, and are therefore
invariant with respect to labour productivity growth.
In this paper, we assume that the efficiency wage relation is only operating in
the high-tech sector.8 Empirically, this assumption seems justiﬁed. Studies by
Brown and Medoff ~1989!, Gera and Grenier ~1994!, and Krueger and Summers
~1988!, have revealed ~i! that there is an interindustry wage structure that is sig-
6 Because of this assumption we will omit the brand indices i from this point onwards.
7 See the Appendix for a formal statement and solution of the producers’ maximization problem.
8 The basic concept of efficiency wages has been studied widely by – among others – Salop ~1979!,
Akerlof ~1982!, and Shapiro and Stiglitz ~1984!. Akerlof and Yellen ~1986!, Katz ~1986!, and Layard,
Nickell and Jackman ~1991! provide good overviews. From this literature it seems fairly well estab-
lished that efficiency wage considerations play a potentially important role in explaining various la-
bour market experiences in developed countries. What all the basic models have in common is that
they contain some reason ~either retaining workers ~Salop ~1979!!, recruiting workers ~Weiss ~1980!!
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plained solely on the basis of standard competitive factors like differences in
skills, working conditions, etc. High-paying industries seem to contain large, capi-
tal-intensive ﬁrms with extensive product market power. These are the character-
istics that we attach to the high-tech sector.
Following Akerlof ~1982!, the main reason in our model for the high-tech firms
to pay efficiency wages is based on sociological considerations. The idea is that
each worker has a certain perception of the amount of effort that a ‘fair’ em-
ployer can ask from him. The employer can affect this fair amount by changing
the wage he pays. The more he pays, the higher the notion of the worker of the
fair amount of effort to be supplied to the employer. The importance of this type
of sociological consideration for explaining various phenomena in the labour mar-
ket is increasingly acknowledged ~see, e.g., Solow ~1980!, and Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler ~1986!!.
With respect to the speciﬁcation of the effort relation we also follow Akerlof
~1982!. The efficiency of a worker in the one sector ~tradeables! depends on the









,g,1, a.0 and c2a51. ~9!
This formulation guarantees an interior solution of the proﬁt maximization prob-
lem for the ﬁrm ~see Appendix!. Invoking the constraints on the parameters im-








This condition states that the ﬁrm will increase its wage as long as a one percent
increase in wages leads to a more than one percent increase in effort. It turns out
that the model exhibits relative nominal wage rigidity ~note that the real wage
rate in the traditional sector equals one, so that relative real wages come down to
real wages in the tradeables sector!. Substitution of Equation ~10! in Equation ~9!





or motivating workers ~Shapiro and Stiglitz ~1984!, and Akerhof ~1982!!! for a proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrm to pay wages that are in excess of market-clearing wages. The result is the existence of equilib-
rium unemployment.
185 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UPThe labour market consists of three segments, viz. employment in the tradeables
sector, employment in the non-tradeables sector and unemployed labour. This
leads to
L5LT1LN1U, ~11!
where U is the number of unemployed people. We will normalize total ~exogen-
ous! labour supply at one ~L51!, so that LT, LN and U can further be seen as
ratios. Total labour allocated in the tradeables sector equals
LT5n~Lx1Lr!. ~12!
We assume that labour is immobile over regions and perfectly mobile within a
region. Unemployed people receive a real unemployment compensation equal to
b, expressed in terms of the non-tradeable good. Consequently, the nominal com-
pensation equals bpN. This compensation is paid out of lump-sum taxes on labour
income, so that total income available in the economy is still described by Equa-
tion ~5!. It is assumed that the net real wage earned in the non-tradeables sector
is higher than the real unemployment compensation, so that the unemployment
compensation b must be sufficiently smaller than 1. In principle, all the people
being unemployed or working in the non-tradeables sector would like to be em-
ployed in the tradeables sector, as this leads to an improvement in their earnings.
With respect to the unemployed we assume that the tradeables sector only re-
cruits workers from the pool of unemployed and that in equilibrium the unem-
ployed are indifferent towards accepting a job in the non-tradeables sector or re-
maining unemployed9 ~see, e.g., Bulow and Summers ~1986!, and Burda ~1988!
for a similar kind of analysis!. If the percentage of jobs which will open up in
the tradeables sector is denoted by d, the probability for an unemployed person
of ﬁnding a job in the tradeables sector equals dLT/U. The numerator of this ex-
pression describes the number of jobs that open up in the tradeables sector every
period. The denominator gives the number of people that are waiting for a job in
this sector. A worker is indifferent towards remaining unemployed or accepting a





UD bwN, where 0#b,1. ~13!
Basically, this relation says that the expected pay-off from accepting a job in the
non-tradeables sector ~left-hand side! is the same as the expected pay-off from
9 This is equivalent to saying that a person employed in the non-tradeables sector is indifferent
towards becoming unemployed or remaining at work in the non-tradeables sector. Bulow and Summers
~1986! ﬁnd this assumption to be justiﬁed both theoretically and empirically.
186 H.L.F. DE GROOT AND A.B.T.M. VAN SCHAIKwaiting until a job in the tradeables sector opens up and remaining unemployed
in the meantime ~right-hand side!.
For each region the model counts 12 equations and 12 unknowns, viz. Lx, Lr,
LT, LN, x, y, U, e, wN/pN,w T/pT,w T/wN and I/p N. Equation ~7!, which determines
the terms of trade pT
1/pT
2, applies to both regions. Labour productivity h will be
explained in section 4 by two dynamic equations. For the moment we have 25
equations and 25 unknowns in total, so that the model can be solved. According
to Walras’ Law one equation should be redundant, but we already left one equa-
tion out ~stating that total income is spent on consumption!. The model is only
solved for real variables. Real income has been denoted in terms of non-trade-
ables, but given the solution for all relative prices, real income in terms of trade-
ables can easily be derived.
3 THE ALLOCATION OF LABOUR
The solution of the model is quite straightforward. After substituting Equation









Note that W~5wT/wN!.1, and by deﬁnition b,1, so that U/LT will rise if one
of the parameters a, b,o rdincreases. According to this relation, there is a posi-
tive correlation between unemployment and high-tech employment. This is a typi-
cal feature of dual labour market models of this kind and these models are often
criticized for this feature ~e.g., Lindbeck and Snower ~1991!!. Two remarks are
important to note here. Firstly, it is not the size of the high-tech sector per se that
matters, but the number of jobs opening up ~dLT!. It is well known from the
search literature ~e.g., Aghion and Howitt ~1994!! that higher growth ~resulting
from a larger high-tech sector in the underlying model! increases creative de-
struction and consequently increases the rate of job separation and equilibrium
unemployment. Though this mechanism is not explicitly modelled here, it can be
used as an argument for the positive relation unemployment and high-tech em-
ployment. Secondly, unemployment in our model results from supply distortions
and should be conceived as wait unemployment, i.e., more workers deliberately
queuing up for high-wage jobs the more of these jobs will become available. It is
this difference in institutional setting of Europe vs. the USA that we want to fo-
cus on and that we conceive as an important element in distinguishing the un-
employment performance of the two regions.
187 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UPCombining the equation for the number of unemployed people with the labour




What this equation basically says is that a rise of employment in the high-tech
sector and the accompanied increase in the number of unemployed people leaves
less workers to be employed in the traditional sector. The second relation be-









Note that 0,s,1, b.0 and e.1, so that S.0. This equation shows that, for
the circular ﬂow to be in equilibrium, an increase in employment in the high-tech
sector must be accompanied with an increase in employment in the traditional
sector.
Equating ~A! and ~B! gives the solution of the model in terms of LT. Note that
in equilibrium the sectoral allocation of labour over sectors is ﬁxed, i.e., inde-
pendent of the development of labour productivity ~h! over time. This will be
explained later on.
The solution of the model can easily be shown in a diagram, which decom-
poses total labour over employment in the non-tradeables sector, employment in
the tradeables sector and unemployment ~see Figure 1!. The slopes of the curves
~A! and ~B! are 11d~W2b!/~12b! and WS, respectively.
In the ﬁgure, we have also drawn the full-employment line, which describes
all possible divisions of labour over sectors for d50. In this case, there is no
reason for people to remain unemployed as no new jobs will open up in the high-
wage sector. If d.0, however, there is unemployment as d~W2b!/~12b!.0.
The level of unemployment is determined by confronting the equilibrium of the
model, i.e., the intersection of line ~A! and line ~B!, with the full-employment
line.
The comparative-static analysis will focus on changes in the parameter b which
is a measure for the generosity of the unemployment compensation system, and
an exogenous change in labour productivity ~h! in the high-tech sector of the
follower region. The results are summarized in Table 1, where we look at the















































Figure 1 – Goods and labour market equilibrium
189 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UPThe wage ratio is known from Equation ~10!. The ratio of prices of high-tech
and traditional goods ~i.e., the intraregional terms of trade! follows from com-
bining Equations ~2! and ~8! with the optimal efficiency of high-tech workers.
The ~interregional! terms of trade is explained by Equation ~7!. This equals the
price ratio in the high-tech sector, obtained by applying Equation ~8! to each re-
gion separately and then dividing.
It is important to note that preferences ~i.e., the parameter s! do not show up
~directly! in these ratios. Relative prices are determined by relative wages ~which
in turn are ﬁxed by the parameters of the efficiency wage relation!, and the de-
velopment of relative labour productivity in the course of time. The productivity
ratio within a region, i.e., between traditional and high-tech goods, is 1/h, whereas
the productivity ratio in the high-tech sector, i.e., between the backward region
and the leader region, is h2/h1. The latter ratio will further be denoted by d.
Another important characteristic of the model follows from the assumption that
the regions are symmetrical with regard to the parameters of the efficiency-wage
relation ~and the strength of competition captured by parameter e!, so that rela-


















The interregional wage ratios equal each other and ~as e.1! these ratios will














showing that relative productivity levels are fully reﬂected in both the ratio of
the intraregional terms of trade and the relative real wage in the high-tech sector.
This dichotomous character of the model causes the sectoral allocation of labour
to be independent of relative productivity, as the productivity ratio in the high-
tech sector is fully reﬂected in relative real labour costs.
Figure 2 looks at the effects of an increase in real unemployment compensa-
tion ~b! in region 2. Line ~A! turns clockwise around its intercept with the LN-
axis. Higher unemployment compensations make people more willing to wait un-
til a job in the high-tech sector becomes available. This reduces employment in
the non-tradeables sector, so that total income diminishes. Accordingly, demand
decreases. As a result, unemployment increases. Labour becomes more expensive
relative to labour in the other region. The ~interregional! terms of trade improves
so that output and employment in the high-tech sector decrease. Thus a more
190 H.L.F. DE GROOT AND A.B.T.M. VAN SCHAIKgenerous unemployment compensation results in higher unemployment and re-
duced employment in both sectors.
Further, we consider an ~exogenous! increase in labour productivity of re-
gion 2, which implies a rise of the productivity ratio in high-tech sector ~d!. The
sectoral structure of employment does not change, because there is no incentive
to change the demand for labour in the tradeables sector if the productivity ratio
increases. ~This is due to pricing behaviour of high-tech ﬁrms ~cf. Equation ~8!!,
TABLE 1 – COMPARATIVE-STATIC RESULTS ~FOR REGION 2!
Increase of Effect on
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Note: The increase in d is due to an increase in h2.
Figure2–A nexogenous increase in unemployment compensation
191 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UPwhich makes unit real labour costs insensitive to productivity changes.! The in-
crease in productivity is followed by a rise of high-tech real wages relative to
high-tech real wages in the other region. The terms of trade deteriorates, so that
output of the tradeables sector in region 2 increases. Thus, in general, the model
predicts that output of the high-tech sector in the backward region grows faster
than output of the high-tech sector in the leader region, if the productivity ratio
increases. The dynamics behind the process of catching up will be described in
the next section.
4 RELATIVE CONVERGENCE
The technology-gap approach to economic growth conceives technological differ-
ences as the primary cause for differences in productivity levels across regions.
Backward economies may catch up by learning from the experiences of the leader
region. As Gerschenkron ~1952! has pointed out, catching up is not conceived as
being automatic; it requires adequate preconditions to imitate the technological
leader, which often contains an element of innovation in its own. A certain level
of R&D, for instance, is a necessary condition for successful imitation ~cf. Fager-
berg ~1994!!. Barro and Sala-i-Martin ~1995! describe this leader-follower mecha-
nism as follows ~p. 281!:
‘The diffusion of technology from leading economies to followers involves
costs of imitation and adaptation. We assume that these costs are lower than those
for innovation when very little has been copied, but rise as the pool of uncopied
ideas gets smaller. This cost structure implies a form of diminishing returns to
imitation and thereby tends to generate a pattern of convergence. Follower coun-
tries tend to grow faster the greater the gap from the leaders. This process is,
however, conditional, in that the growth rate depends, for a given technological
gap, on government policies and other variables that inﬂuence the rate of return
to imitation in a follower economy.’
To model this we follow Krugman ~1990, chapter 7!, and Van de Klundert and
Smulders ~1996! and assume that the dynamics of labour productivity in the two
regions are given by10
10 Note that the macroeconomic growth rate is a weighted average of the sectoral growth rates.
More concrete, the macroeconomic growth rate ~gm! of region i equals sih ~i/hi. In terms of the pa-









, and i51, 2.






Here, j~.0! stands for an ~exogenous! productivity parameter in the R&D labs,
and Lr is the number of workers employed in the R&D labs. As total labour L is
normalized at one, we can call nLr the R&D employment ratio. High-tech ﬁrms
improve their labour productivity by investing in R&D. In addition, ﬁrms in the
backward region ~region 2! can also learn from ﬁrms in the other region ~re-
gion 1!, for example by transferring or copying technologies from the leader
ﬁrms, which do not have to be developed by the followers on their own. Firms
in the follower country receive a productivity bonus ~d2a!, which is negatively
related to d and positively to a. The parameter a measures the strength of the
one-sided spillovers in knowledge between regions. The productivity bonus is
highly institutionally determined and contains for instance investments in physi-
cal infrastructure, education, the quality of the legal system in the backward re-
gion, and the readiness or capability ~in terms of, for example, technological con-
gruence! of poor countries to adapt new technologies.

















This equation shows that the productivity ratio may increase, decrease or remain
constant, depending on the respective amounts of labour employed in the R&D
labs, the strength of spillovers, and the initial productivity ratio. Thus the model
can explain that an initial leading region becomes a backward region ~compare
this with the leapfrogging idea of Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon ~1991!!, that re-
gions diverge, or that there is a tendency for regions neither to converge nor to
diverge. In the latter case ~a constant productivity ratio! the wealth of nations
measured in absolute productivity levels still increases, because high-tech pro-
ductivity is ~steadily! growing. All these cases are relevant from an empirical

































193 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UPpoint of view, as has been widely documented in the literature ~cf. Maddison
~1995!!.
The process of catching up will come to an end if ~ d50. The associated steady-







To investigate the dynamics of the model the steady-state locus should be con-
fronted with the temporary equilibrium locus, which reads ~after combining Equa-













Behind the dynamics of the model is the mechanism of international trade. It is
important to realize that according to mark-up pricing, the terms of trade depends












The follower country initially faces a productivity ratio smaller than one and
lower wages than in the leader country. However, the lower wage ratio cannot
fully compensate for the difference in labour productivity, so that the price of the
high-tech good of the follower country is higher than the price of the high-tech
good of the leader country. The follower country will experience an increase in
market share in the world market for high-tech goods if it is able to increase the
productivity ratio and thus to lower the terms of trade. As Figure 3 reveals, this
will always be the case if a.e21. In this case the SSL is sloping downwards,
so that the model is stable.
11 A relatively high value of a implies more interna-
tional spillovers, so that there is more room for price decreases in the follower
country. A relatively low value of e indicates that the ~bundle of! product variet-
ies supplied by the follower country are substantially differentiated from those
supplied by the leader country, so that the follower country can relatively easily
compete on the world market for high-tech goods ~despite lower productivity and
higher prices compared to the leader country!.
11 The SSL is upward-sloping if e21.a. A relatively high value of e implies small differences in
varieties, so that there is much competition by prices. In this case the model is stable if TEL inter-
sects SSL from below.
194 H.L.F. DE GROOT AND A.B.T.M. VAN SCHAIKFigure 3 depicts the dynamic evolution of two regions that differ in two re-
spects. Region 2 initially lags behind region 1. Furthermore, region 2 is charac-
terized by a more generous unemployment compensation system, resulting in high
unemployment and a relatively low number of people employed in the R&D labs.
The growth rate of region 1 only depends on its research intensity and is thus
constant ~given constancy of the R&D employment ratio over time!. The devel-
opment of productivity in region 2 relative to region 1 is driven by two factors.
It is positively affected by its ‘backwardness,’ and negatively by its relatively
small research department. In the diagram, the positive ‘backwardness’ effect
dominates initially, resulting in catching up. Ultimately, a steady state is reached
in which the positive ‘backwardness’ effect is exactly offset by the negative ‘rela-
tive research intensity’ effect. Starting from some initial productivity ratio ~point
S!, the economy will move along the temporary equilibrium locus towards the
point where SSL and TEL intersect ~point E!. In the steady state the two regions
will grow at the same pace, but at different levels. In the ﬁgure the follower
country has a smaller R&D employment ratio than the leader country, implying
Figure 3 – The dynamics of the model
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This result shows that persisting differences in productivity levels between re-
gions can be explained by persisting differences in employment shares of the
tradeables sectors. As we have seen in the previous section, interregional differ-
ences in high-tech employment shares ~and consequently in R&D employment
ratios! crucially depend on differences in the social welfare system. Higher un-
employment compensations decrease the fraction of workers in the high-tech sec-
tor relative to the total labour force, so that there is less R&D.
5 EMPIRICAL ISSUES
The model developed in this paper stresses the role of high-tech and high-wage
sectors in trade between countries with similar tastes, which predominantly ex-
change very similar, substitutable products. The signiﬁcance of high-tech ﬁrms
and industries for macroeconomic development has been explored extensively in
recent theoretical and empirical literature on technology and employment. An ex-
ample is the analysis in the OECD Jobs Study ~1994!. The premises of this com-
prehensive study are in line with the model developed above. In the same way,
the OECD stresses the coincidence of imperfect competition in product markets
and wage differentials in labour markets
13: ‘The duality of the labour market un-
der these circumstances also introduces frictions in the workings of the market
mechanism: the unemployed may prolong their job search in the hope of getting
into ‘high-wage’ ﬁrms and sectors, and displaced workers from the ‘high-wage’
ﬁrms and sectors may have very high replacement rates and hence reservation
wages when compensations are based on previous earnings.’
The OECD Jobs Study extensively explores the relation between ‘high-tech’
and ‘high-wage’ sectors. Starting point is the empirical ‘stylized fact’ that pro-
duction and sales of manufactured goods takes place in conditions of more or
less imperfect competition. R&D spending is increasingly seen as a major source
of sunk costs, and therefore of imperfect competition. Product differentiation ad-
vantages arise from buyers’ preferences for a speciﬁc variety of very similar sub-
stitutable products. ~Possible reasons are network externalities and investment in
information gathering before using the near substitute.! Moreover, there is grow-
12 Notice that we deal with nearly symmetrical countries and that the only difference we allow for
~apart from an initial productivity ratio smaller than one! is b2.b1.
13 OECD Jobs Study ~1994!, part II, section IV, The effect of imperfect product market competition
on wages and employment.
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sistent ‘supernormal’ proﬁts. Rents come about because competitors cannot enter
and eliminate supernormal proﬁts. The OECD Jobs Study presents empirical evi-
dence on rent-sharing, strongly suggesting that wages differ considerably across
broad sectors, even after controlling for age, education, occupation, and gender
and that wage premia are relatively stable across time. Manufacturing is the sec-
tor paying a relatively high wage premium, whereas the service sectors are gen-
erally ‘low-wage’ sectors ~with the exception of the banking sector!. The OECD
Jobs Study distinguishes two main reasons for rent-sharing: union pressure and
efficiency wages. These two factors may be operating at the same time, but for
the purpose of our paper we have chosen to incorporate only efficiency wage
considerations into the analysis.
An important problem in the ~empirical! studies on technology and employ-
ment is that there are numerous deﬁnitions of high-technology industries. The
most commonly used are industries which have the highest R&D intensity ~for
instance deﬁned as the number of workers spending the majority of their time on
R&D, or as the ratio of business-enterprise R&D to production! in the OECD
area as a whole. This deﬁnition excludes those industries which do little R&D
even when they are ~major! users of technologically sophisticated equipment. To
remedy this, the deﬁnition can be broadened by taking into account the propor-
tion of high-technology inputs embodied in ﬁnal products. Applying this concept
eliminates all intermediate products and resolves each ﬁnal product into its ulti-
mate constituent elements: labour and knowledge. This procedure resembles the
concept of vertically integrated industries as proposed by Pasinetti ~1981!. Total
research labour ‘embodied’ in a ﬁnal product is then decisive for its classiﬁcation
under high-tech or traditional goods.
The OECD Jobs Study ~part I, Annex 4.A! has grouped manufacturing indus-
tries according to technology and wages. A distinction has been made between
high, medium, and low-technology groups on the one hand and high, medium,
and low-wage groups on the other hand. It appears that most high-technology
industries indeed pay high wages. The OECD also shows trends in high-technol-
ogy industries across countries, for example in Table 4.1 ~part I!, which shows
the development of an international specialization index for high, medium and
low wage/technology industries between 1970 and 1992.14 The table reveals that
‘the group of European Community countries have become increasingly special-
ized in low-wage and low-tech products as compared to the USA and Japan. Be-
tween 1970 and 1989, manufacturing employment in Japan increased by 4 per
cent overall, in the USA by 1.5 per cent, while in the EC it declined by about 20
percent.’ This evidence ~in addition to the evidence on total factor productivity
14 The specialization ~or revealed comparative advantage! index for a particular type of industry is
its share in a country’s total manufacturing exports divided by the same share for all OECD countries
taken together.
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However, further empirical research will be needed to identify the high-tech sec-
tor of an economy and to adequately measure research labour embodied in ﬁnal
products.
6 CONCLUSION
The model developed in this paper suggests various ~hypothetical! reasons for the
intriguing empirical fact that European countries were catching up with the USA
in the ﬁfties and the sixties and stayed behind afterwards. Crucial is the recog-
nition that the sectoral structure of economies and institutions on the labour mar-
ket is important to understand the development of relative productivity levels
among countries. The model predicts that ‘backwardness’ and relatively high em-
ployment shares of manufacturing were the driving forces behind European eco-
nomic growth in the ﬁfties and sixties. In Europe, a generous unemployment sys-
tem emerged in the late sixties. This change in system led to an increase in
unemployment rates in the European countries, and reduced employment shares
in the manufacturing sector. The accompanied adverse effect on the number of
people working in Research and Development can explain the subsequent lagging
behind ~relative convergence! of Europe.
As argued in the introduction, macroeconomic growth empirics seems to have
reached a dead end. The great majority of the ‘new growth’ models are essen-
tially one-commodity models, with no structural change, no transitional dynam-
ics, and lack of attention to institutions. A promising way to breathe new life into
growth empirics seems to us the development and testing of multi-commodity
models with a sharper focus on sectoral structures, international differences in
technical knowledge, and institutional factors. The model of this paper contrib-
utes to this type of endogenous growth models. The model ends up with a dy-
namic equation for relative productivity growth, which explains the process of
catching up in terms of relative R&D intensities and initial productivity ratios.
Empirical research might take this equation as a starting point. A more extended
estimation equation is obtained after expressing the R&D intensities in terms of
the parameters of the model. Important institutional deteminants of the sectoral
structure ~and thus of R&D intensities! are, among other things, wage differences
between sectors, and the generosity of the compensation system. It should be no-
ticed that, just as in neo-classical growth empirics, the estimation equation is de-
duced from a consistent framework, which serves as a disciplinary device to avoid
testing without theory. Thus, by regressing economic growth more directly on
institutional factors of the labour market, new empirical regularities might be de-
tected, which will increase our understanding of the complex process of the de-
velopment of the wealth of nations.
15 See footnote 1.
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In this appendix we will describe the behaviour of the ﬁrm operating in the high-
tech sector. Each ﬁrm maximizes its operating proﬁts by choosing wTi and Lxi






subject to the efficiency wage relation ~9! and the demand function for the vari-



























If we now use the Akerlof speciﬁcation as has been speciﬁed in the text ~Equa-
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Summary
UNEMPLOYMENT AND CATCHING UP: EUROPE VIS-A v-VIS THE USA
This paper develops a two-region two-sector endogenous growth model with a dual labour market
based on efficiency wages. Growth is driven by research done in the ~high-tech! tradeables sector.
The follower region tends to catch up in terms of labour productivity with the leader region. Differ-
ences in unemployment compensation systems can lead to relative convergence, i.e., a steady state
with the backward region lagging behind the leader region. The reason for this is that high social
welfare compensations generate high unemployment and reduce the amount of labour employed for
R&D purposes.
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